根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100
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y* q3 d6 ~* ^) ]+ MFrom: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>
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( p' u* T2 b6 x+ q' y7 XTo: sans@clark.net
, e3 y# k0 t3 } h, _5 z$ Z5 KSubject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords& ^7 a5 F! W! a3 I3 a) I5 n, H
Hi all,& e* a, ]* ~9 ~( O, J8 x; `
We knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across
" ~* B6 D7 ~5 t8 X6 B* othe system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
# W1 Y w% D* j: U# l4 [IIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can( d6 }2 \2 W. R$ X
be compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,
% M0 |+ U& z y$ @Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file:
. D( ~ `9 B, g+ YC:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
3 R1 R& X, o7 E, M, M- hThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:3 O0 J7 \! x1 o* t0 h/ u8 U: M
- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the5 A! C2 W# J. W3 x
MMC)
2 v* q* a" J3 J5 ~: ~- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)
D9 |9 b6 s; R- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of
$ d6 g2 X7 P9 `& Nyour virtual directories is located there.( J* L% Z/ x* Y1 x2 y* e" B
- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
% K2 u3 E( ?- R& I( J$ Y"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).& s3 X9 z" }* S+ S! O0 a
Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are6 X9 H0 D. k3 b+ b1 v7 h* A
srambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM
. R: [& r& W a/ R7 p4 v( phave permissions on this file.
! ?; |/ M* p8 M4 sBUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print
$ Y& V# J% k" K! u3 d7 V- Fthese passwords in CLEAR TEXT.* |( W! P! i, y, l
The user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a2 g, U0 P/ u; ~5 A) n$ h; e
malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.5 w, G5 j; N" T+ [: q" v+ X: h* f
Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow7 Q. L" v. `# @# ^1 q# p) ~
logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the
; U1 D! u& D" z- N2 eproblem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:$ n/ e5 k$ S+ K* r
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IIS 4.0 Metabase3 n" R3 V: c0 l% x# }3 m+ m$ o
?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr; q3 ~ y( Z* ] c6 d8 c0 @; L
--- UNC User ---" G4 [2 v# T# B6 {
UNC User name: 'Lou'
8 d7 t0 w1 L" V! _UNC User password: 'Microsoft'0 C) O; |6 o: X; G' u
UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'
; e0 _# h% |6 p* L1 H--- Anonymous User ---! a( U" e# W% H+ P/ ?! A
Anonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'+ u( G A( ]3 O2 W
Anonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
: m# i5 F5 e+ R5 vPassword synchronization: 'False'" l& z6 v" |- i. H& _7 E! d( K9 ^
--- IIS Logs DSN User ---
9 R) J; i+ I/ ZODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG') o( R4 n. E% ?1 K2 ?
ODBC table name: 'InternetLog'0 J" o7 O- c5 \4 J1 e; ~+ u% l
ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'3 c: I% |7 e% A6 S: y# |/ @# o
ODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'! s+ h0 s) q0 H$ B: ?
--- Web Applications User ---
' y3 A! j1 I: t- A& ?4 v5 [WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'
5 G- s/ @/ W& z, D2 E' _8 v* TWAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'. J+ T" [7 p, c1 Z$ [
Default Logon Domain: ''
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For example, you can imagine the following scenario:
7 O) }5 y+ }8 E X S) `$ TA user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say9 s: @* r! m7 V6 M8 y# D
server (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
9 ]% z' q. L8 I) y* V% han IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts- \: r. F( X {, C" Q2 ^6 m
the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual
* b- o2 f1 y- G1 ydirectory located on another server, say (b).
2 H7 u: S K0 i$ j' Q. G* C j- JNow, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).
: g' r( F; _( Q6 M) _* lAnd so forth...9 R1 ~' K) V' K9 R( m
Microsoft was informed of this vulnerability.2 {' z: F" @3 Z) s$ b# E
_______________________________________________________________________
5 R/ w" ~; u0 k" i( y1 ^Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr0 m/ q N5 U( L H$ o* P
MCP NT 4.0
- d4 |) h ]% g/ G0 K; qInternet, Security and Microsoft solutions
8 V P t5 D* s0 M/ ]e-business Services* S' x. [4 A7 J' P; U4 L2 U$ O
IBM Global Services( D8 Z. L1 v$ K
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