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          NT的密碼究竟放在哪

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          發(fā)表于 2011-1-12 21:01:17 | 只看該作者 |倒序瀏覽 |閱讀模式
          根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡單加密形式包含在一個文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100
          ( x) l8 m5 y7 m1 Q" i+ I2 ]- ]1 a8 [5 y2 Z, |& _% X. ?: v! I
          From: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>
          9 m+ R5 u3 l. {- Y" A( P7 @8 w6 T1 L$ ]/ b7 _9 O+ N+ o3 @9 l. w+ s
          To: sans@clark.net+ b) i: N% r$ `, U
          Subject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords
          " v& Y+ t5 z/ N% qHi all,1 u7 j6 x  q% c3 B- A& @
          We knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across7 M8 y* _2 ^: `0 M: e
          the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
          ( r9 k. N: {3 bIIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can/ L- a. \( Y2 M3 ?- y
          be compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,2 s& N* Q; ?& K, h5 r% m2 F
          Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file:
          + y0 _7 w7 B+ T8 t. iC:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
          $ `; C7 }1 r$ B0 j' mThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:
          ! t# h8 F  A7 W* b5 ^, H6 H8 C- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the, b5 i8 R( c7 ^8 j; j
          MMC)
          0 B4 q7 v5 V8 q0 C3 _$ e- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)0 |0 B7 U' y' `+ ~' N
          - UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of! x4 y+ `- s& _& H. U9 q
          your virtual directories is located there.
          7 ^( ]1 F( |0 K1 O! B- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
          ' p+ W1 v! f$ B" k9 ~; Y"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).
          ' O9 N/ J8 G9 ?" R& R, J% _Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are2 ~4 _, G" }; P/ U- v
          srambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM  y* e4 S; g$ U& W$ r% G
          have permissions on this file.5 c0 v0 r5 U) Q6 F. S1 H; l% k! R
          BUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print, V1 {1 C) n4 ~$ |: b
          these passwords in CLEAR TEXT.8 ~  e* \4 r( z1 t& F" s$ W) r
          The user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a
          5 m5 h  n0 ]+ r! J5 l* E3 Vmalicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.5 C% l; G4 n& M
          Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow7 g# A% P" @+ p
          logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the5 l. U, N- r7 x5 f( R
          problem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:4 ^; k" I% c, ?4 x- N" H- s8 }
          "
          9 J* z9 h+ t. f1 h( Z; P. lIIS 4.0 Metabase
          2 M, h) W5 A/ J3 l$ m?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr2 m& |9 a. B! M( [
          --- UNC User ---; x) s6 i: b& U3 [) R
          UNC User name: 'Lou'
          1 S& C3 ]* B" LUNC User password: 'Microsoft'
          4 |) G1 U8 E! _0 u; TUNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'
          ! n5 O7 i- q" p: }--- Anonymous User ---$ e1 L$ x$ K0 {5 O
          Anonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'4 _- W+ D' k2 j: ]
          Anonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
          1 ^, p/ x4 m% S# ~Password synchronization: 'False'/ E. U; x) [* }) L
          --- IIS Logs DSN User ---
          $ B; n" G" E' m9 ~+ nODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'8 t, q8 F9 n" ~4 f  I% {
          ODBC table name: 'InternetLog'
          * b5 f( z8 V& NODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'- S0 M5 Z+ _' n. V( ]& s, a
          ODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'
          5 J* q! a' P3 u& \4 g. S' h. p$ D+ k--- Web Applications User ---  B4 T+ C/ ?  _
          WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'* `% M( \! z0 l" J0 W! i* q' A
          WAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'
          ' |& V: U6 e* ?6 [% bDefault Logon Domain: ''* |: l* P! Y% T1 {4 [- h* O$ ]$ ~0 P( O
          "" d" N6 Z' q; K9 a
          For example, you can imagine the following scenario:
          ! g# h1 Q% ^' z' p1 `$ R! BA user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say, c  n- a6 p+ s! o; C4 H# f
          server (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
          5 X, c. T0 J# Q$ aan IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts
          8 c/ A$ W  s! U* X) Dthe login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual3 r' z+ A* U9 z& F6 {
          directory located on another server, say (b)./ r5 r& ]. n% K( ~
          Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b)." h! k8 f! H4 s0 R+ x" q& [( N7 m
          And so forth...
          ; V* Y4 g8 ?# S+ f/ T: }Microsoft was informed of this vulnerability.7 z- N* e* e/ ]$ t* W3 s
          _______________________________________________________________________. n6 V3 G3 i, }
          Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr0 ^$ `% \9 v: S' B2 C( B8 i
          MCP NT 4.0
          & Y5 l9 v3 L/ P, w6 jInternet, Security and Microsoft solutions
          * B" c0 l6 c! ~6 we-business Services# ?0 R$ H% O) C% ~0 o/ ]1 C
          IBM Global Services
          # Z; g8 o6 X% [
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