NT的密碼究竟放在哪

根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡(jiǎn)單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100
. g3 B; P6 n" A# }  W- T: X
# N" G; O) v/ h+ x1 {From: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>
" @( n8 M5 ^& E, v  D$ h
3 H9 m6 u" X; A0 K7 P3 G0 j/ Y$ G' xTo: sans@clark.net
Subject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords
Hi all,
. B3 {6 C& t; P" g" kWe knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across
4 j5 I7 q) |! o3 b7 Ythe system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
' l2 B5 I! h- b6 m8 c; a4 ]IIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can
  K5 g9 a& c+ x6 B& Bbe compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,
Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file:
C:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
The IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:
. A- r5 e( C1 {5 V9 @# i9 Z/ h- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the
5 O! E  C$ {2 K" g; cMMC)
- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)
- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of
your virtual directories is located there.
- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).
, @. |( ^; v, _4 }& {% g* GNote that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are
* F7 Z: H; j$ ysrambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM
have permissions on this file.
' q: I* U+ j3 N3 I1 NBUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print
$ K$ e. S3 \' t  ^- othese passwords in CLEAR TEXT.
+ R/ d5 [6 O4 C! Y: N% s* |! PThe user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a
" a% L! _& v$ E$ }malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.
7 k( X! N8 Y3 h4 JObviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow
logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the
problem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:
"
: f2 |3 W5 c' ]: S& m5 \IIS 4.0 Metabase
$ S$ M5 F) B  B?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr
6 j2 |3 c' D  `8 c8 n) g2 `6 X2 |--- UNC User ---
. k& r7 \6 C) Z6 l3 ~UNC User name: 'Lou'
3 {* J3 l( h- K4 x/ ]. d+ {UNC User password: 'Microsoft'
UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'
--- Anonymous User ---
5 A9 {  l+ J) B4 @* yAnonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'
6 Q& C0 B' [- o8 P% {0 NAnonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
- _( z+ j' K3 {( s- \0 oPassword synchronization: 'False'
--- IIS Logs DSN User ---
  h  I& L. M6 B) I0 ^* DODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'
  D$ U, m& o, a1 F& |5 W/ RODBC table name: 'InternetLog'
ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'
: }* r; A' i+ z( v  SODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'
- V$ {) U, T8 ]+ u8 V--- Web Applications User ---
WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'
5 c  m9 m& T" l/ lWAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'
: p1 l# J! g+ P; D, Y1 {Default Logon Domain: ''
"
9 f! W' x- g% g; u- BFor example, you can imagine the following scenario:
5 P. d1 N/ Z2 `7 h0 y* ZA user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say
4 u$ X# \/ L, p2 d  dserver (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
an IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts
the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual
* T; F( `  r1 r" o$ I! B( ?directory located on another server, say (b).
) h7 S+ X: X% F" `+ ], _Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).
And so forth...
% V8 E+ A; T) f9 h5 o; B6 i' G. j; gMicrosoft was informed of this vulnerability.
! Y( ~: w5 `; i4 e: p1 O, w4 N" i. Z! R* s_______________________________________________________________________
Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr
9 |2 o# N$ }2 s) OMCP NT 4.0
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