標(biāo)題: NT的密碼究竟放在哪 [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: 雜七雜八 時(shí)間: 2011-1-12 21:01 標(biāo)題: NT的密碼究竟放在哪 根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡(jiǎn)單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100 5 d5 x$ X# G8 F$ x6 f, }$ ?" u* d. J, V2 v' r) z, ~% q
From: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr> ' X: u, G+ i8 z8 C( s ( i! k* r- r% L. P+ u2 [To: sans@clark.net/ ~) D; P" T+ l9 ^+ m' \
Subject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords6 U& i- O: T2 M( l6 n; f0 \
Hi all, $ m9 @* O$ k1 B. h3 iWe knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across : g- I3 k' a8 U) `( ~9 V3 M' jthe system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.! d! T- ~, [5 I
IIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can . f$ d0 X2 r: mbe compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives, O7 S" y% l' r: D: h' n: t% ]1 r
Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file: 0 R+ w2 }) f; A7 d" r9 h _C:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin . @5 b y* w6 m) g# [* X0 s- LThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords: 1 |& p& X2 p6 a7 m- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the : k) V( X: {7 u( d% j6 G; i. K: LMMC)# r* ~$ v4 Q$ j
- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !) ' h: `. D1 o3 O+ G% {9 \7 D+ y6 ]- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of 2 n7 Q: U. r! V" ^your virtual directories is located there. : [& y1 E0 {7 _' W- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called " N" ~. M+ t% B; Q"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database). ! l# {# e2 S* W7 A9 b5 S% O [Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are & B; Z6 B" n( Y% I! h( S2 Lsrambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM7 M0 ^5 Z9 }) A$ m7 p* b8 U
have permissions on this file. 4 s' i& B& |; cBUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print * _3 Z+ H$ x! m3 V0 o( vthese passwords in CLEAR TEXT. 5 m1 G( g- I- f) W6 G( a* i1 d) b4 VThe user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a; h3 O: i0 \- L3 m
malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.! _: T& E8 A0 Z
Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow9 M4 K4 a$ h+ s% d2 ^$ ?2 k
logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the" O: L4 t1 n: k7 v
problem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:2 |, r; y7 a8 p6 X( h9 G
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IIS 4.0 Metabase ^; J8 V1 a/ t1 }! p V" `?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr 7 z1 T' ?7 a1 |5 k- q0 x, j# H--- UNC User --- 2 C% ^) T" I3 ~4 ?6 y1 JUNC User name: 'Lou' 2 m) i7 ?9 }' l+ \1 z: c# ?" t: y% E5 jUNC User password: 'Microsoft'& N6 b2 _" q% M& `
UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'0 e/ \6 e. P* m1 @' p2 ~4 _
--- Anonymous User ---8 }% Q8 p5 l ^; y
Anonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER' ( o) d7 ]" T% |8 F2 A" r/ q: g* tAnonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp' ) x5 x' P- Y5 l$ M; Y! SPassword synchronization: 'False'" `. e, w+ s& I
--- IIS Logs DSN User --- 2 ~$ z) O& X% T5 B3 h" o2 \ODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'( ~. ]) E3 ?) L5 k
ODBC table name: 'InternetLog' * x7 w5 h0 \! u. DODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'2 U9 [) R5 b6 o; s; P8 ~9 f9 Z: A
ODBC User password: 'xxxxxx' " J' S' M* T5 n' ]$ D; o0 t--- Web Applications User ---, a2 O9 J7 t9 C2 R5 k
WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER' 4 r! e% `) u# j8 V0 T6 R% m( }WAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2' 7 D! ]! x! u8 n: _2 xDefault Logon Domain: '' 2 L% J% m9 z% K* [! ~"; [: {0 L* X; y. I9 O
For example, you can imagine the following scenario: # \6 M$ ` X+ L, {0 yA user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say( }. |! n0 u7 q! L' w, |
server (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example + b! I" _* O% s9 G) C' x* b+ p9 Ban IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts% J! o( t9 A+ T$ J$ N4 K' ~8 J
the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual m1 ^" D. |0 z/ _, k/ zdirectory located on another server, say (b).- n( q. ~ Z5 N v$ Q5 V0 f2 P6 R
Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b). # ^* ]- E3 ~; b' ?( i/ yAnd so forth... 9 h" x4 S! X+ I/ FMicrosoft was informed of this vulnerability. 3 J9 c& e5 R! q' N: o8 T_______________________________________________________________________ 6 \9 G& A: R; r8 G: {; ?Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr8 _# X- I7 c2 [. K- _
MCP NT 4.07 S; l/ \* Y+ c1 a+ r# o' P
Internet, Security and Microsoft solutions 0 K$ ]1 l/ f2 ]e-business Services) b; m* A+ P( u0 @/ R0 o
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